Many regulated industries involve an oligopoly market structure. We examine optimal incentive regulation for a duopoly model of spatial competition when ®rms have private cost information. Market structure is endogenous as regulation determines market segments for ®rms and output distribution across consumers in each ®rm's market. By varying the assignment of consumers to ®rms, a relatively more ef®cient ®rm can be rewarded with a larger market, thus reducing quantity incentive distortions. We derive the optimal policy, assess the impact of asymmetric information relative to full information, and examine extensions to allow for ex ante asymmetries in ®rm structure.
Introduction
In many regulated markets we observe an imperfectly competitive or oligopolistic market structure in which ®rms sell products differentiated along dimensions such as location or quality. Often, these ®rms have local monopoly power over an identi®able``close'' segment of the market and competition is concentrated on consumers who are located iǹ`f ringe'' segments of the market. Local monopoly power is identi®ed with market segments for which the products of other ®rms are a poor substitute while competition between ®rms takes place in fringe segments where no ®rm has a signi®cant advantage. Markets with these features can be found in several industries. To take a prominent example, health care involves regulated markets where quality is an important source of differentiation, leading to specialization and brand loyalty. Providers have an advantage in their specialty and with their loyal or current patients, but compete at the fringe of their specialty and for new patients. Strategic market assignment is a central issue in the debate on national health care market reform in the U.S., with California's selective contracting program having been widely emulated and often cited as a model for the country as a whole (Bamezai et al. 2003) . The California program allows the State Medicaid program as well as private insurers to negotiate price-quantity schedules with hospitals and others providers. They still contract, however, with relatively less ef®cient providers for bene®ciaries who have no effective alternative. Selective contracting has been credited with making the rate of medical care in¯ation in California among the lowest in the U.S. (Zwanziger and Melnick 1988) . 1 Markets for telecommunications provide further examples, as for instance, with cable and satellite television systems.
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These examples raise a number of questions for incentives and regulation. First, how should policy be oriented with regard to the allocation or movement of consumers between ®rms, and what are the bene®ts associated with allowing or inducing competition to attract such consumers? Further, how should changes in market shares associated with the movement of consumers at the``fringe'' be allowed to impact the other consumers who remain with an expanding or contracting ®rm? Finally, expansions and contractions in market share lead directly to questions about underlying cost structure (e.g., natural monopoly) and ef®ciency when regulation involves multiple suppliers. As applied to health care, these questions relate to managed care and selective contracting as policy seeks to allocate consumers to various providers and determine the terms under which patients are to be served.
In this paper, we examine the potential bene®ts under optimal incentive regulation from the strategic assignment of consumers in a simple Hotelling model of horizontal differentiation. The model involves a duopoly setting in which ®rms with market power have private cost information. With regard to policy instruments, the regulator assigns market segments, which are continuously variable in the spatial dimension, as well as prices and quantities for individual consumers. At the level of the individual consumer, we allow for variable demand so that consumption may vary across consumers. 3 We also allow for a fairly general structure of production costs and assess the role of constant, increasing and decreasing returns. Firms distribute output to consumers and costs rise with distance from the ®rm's location (equivalently, value falls as the horizontal quality match deteriorates); thus, each ®rm necessarily has a cost advantage with nearby consumers (local monopoly).
We focus on the structure of optimal incentive regulation regarding the trade-off between assignment of market segments and the allocation of production (via prices) across consumers in each ®rm's market segment. As a result, regulation determines the size of each ®rm's market and the intensity with which each market is served. Note that the allocation of production in a given market segment corresponds to a spatial extension of the (Baron and Myerson 1982) framework for monopoly regulation. 4 With a spatial dimension for consumers and more than one ®rm, the focus of regulatory policy shifts. Now the regulator can provide an additional incentive by awarding part of a less ef®cient ®rm's market to a relatively more ef®cient rival, reducing the need to rely on price and quantity distortions within each market segment. Consumers who are reassigned can then bene®t from being in the market of the more ef®cient ®rm while those who remain with their current ®rm face a smaller incentive distortion in prices.
A brief summary of the optimal policy runs as follows. Because distribution is costly, it is always optimal to award distinct market segments and, further, consumption varies with consumer location. Optimal control methods then provide a price schedule that implements the ef®cient distribution of output within each market segment. With regard to incentives, market size and production are reduced as a ®rm becomes less ef®cient. The other ®rm is awarded a larger market by reassigning consumers near the boundary between market segments (the competitive fringe) and produces more in aggregate. The reassignment of consumers also creates an externality for consumers who stay with their current ®rm. These welfare effects are determined by scale economies; under increasing returns, for instance, prior customers of an expanding ®rm will pay a lower price and consume more.
The overall impact of the distortions created by asymmetric cost information on the optimal policy for regulated market structure can be assessed via a comparison with the full information (®rst best) case. For the benchmark case of constant returns in production, we ®nd that asymmetric information makes market size and production more sensitive to ef®ciency differences between the ®rms. That is, the relatively less ef®cient ®rm receives a smaller market share and produces less as compared to full information outcomes. The situation is more subtle when scale economies are present, however, and we identify 3 By contrast, when individual consumers have inelastic demands (e.g., for a unit of the good), aggregate demand over the spatial market is a constant. Variations in market assignment then shift these consumers from one ®rm to the other, directly determining the required change in production levels. In this case, market segments and production allocations cease to be distinct policy instruments. 4 Absent multiple ®rms and potential competition, the optimal incentive policy for a single ®rm serving a ®xed market results in a second best allocation in which price is distorted upwards and quantity downwards for individual consumers, re¯ecting the cost of providing incentives under incomplete information. For a recent survey and references to this literature, see Armstrong and Sappington (2002) .
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several competing effects that can modify the impact of asymmetric information. Finally, in practice, we can often identify ex ante asymmetries among competing ®rms (e.g.,`w ireless'' in telecommunications). Therefore, we extend the model in several directions to examine ex ante asymmetries in distribution costs, the degree of asymmetric cost information, and the location of ®rms. An intriguing ®nding when ®rms have asymmetric locations is that a``divided'' market structure emerges endogenously under the optimal policy. When this occurs, the more ef®cient ®rm supplies not only nearby customers but also very distant ones while the less ef®cient ®rm retains only those customers who are close to its location.
Several papers in the literature on incentives and regulation address issues that arise in imperfectly competitive and oligopolistic industries, including that of endogenous market structure, our main concern in this paper. 5 In particular, McGuire and Riordan (1995) and Wolinsky (1997) also utilize a spatial framework to examine regulation and market structure. McGuire and Riordan (1995) employ the (Laffont and Tirole 1986 ) framework, in which ®rms have private cost information and can devote effort to cost reduction, and analyze the optimal regulatory choice of a sole source (monopoly) versus dual source (duopoly, via equal division) market structure. Wolinsky (1997) examines a spatial model with private cost information and also introduces a vertical dimension to quality; the quality level, however, is chosen by the ®rms and can only be in¯uenced indirectly by regulation. Taking this in¯uence into account, Wolinsky (1997) examines the ef®cacy of different regulatory regimes, including the assignment of market shares. In both of these papers, individual consumers have inelastic (unit) demands for the good. Thus, variations in market shares reallocate buyers from one ®rm to another but there are no changes in consumption levels at the individual or aggregate level. Our analysis is then complementary as we focus on the independent trade-off between market assignment and production allocation when individual consumer demand is elastic. 6 We present the model in section 2. In section 3 we show how market segments arise and derive a measure of regulatory bene®ts based on an optimal distribution of each ®rm's aggregate output to consumers over assigned markets. Existence and uniqueness of the optimal policy is examined in section 4. We discuss the structure of the optimal policy and comparative statics in section 5, which has a detailed example for the case of constant 5 Also related are the problems of regulated ®rms who face entry or competition from a (strategic) unregulated ®rm, as in Biglaiser and Ma (1995) , and regulated ®rms who participate in outside markets, as in Anton and Gertler (1988) . In some settings, regulatory constraints, such as price caps, are imposed on an incumbent across markets, with the ®rm operating as a monopolist in some and facing competition in others; see Armstrong and Vickers (1993) , Anton et al. (2002) , and Valletti et al. (2002) . Finally, endogenous market structure issues also arise with the provision of incentives to multiple potential suppliers, as in Riordan (1996) , or internal units, as in Kerschbamer and Tournas (2003) . 6 As the discussion above indicates, the models also have other important differences with respect to the assumed underlying economic structure. Several other studies examine market assignment or production quantity dimensions under incomplete information. With respect to quantity, Anton and Yao (1992) develop a model of split award auctions in procurement. Auriol and Laffont (1992) study optimal auctions with variable quantity for several information settings. Dana and Spier (1994) examine mechanism design and market structure with the discrete award choices of a monopoly, duopoly or government producer. See also the analysis of price rationing in Gilbert and Klemperer (2000) .
returns in production costs and constant elasticity of demand. Readers with a stronger interest in the policy side of the model may wish to skim sections 3 and 4 or proceed directly to section 5 after section 2. The effect of asymmetric cost information on the policy is analyzed in section 6. In section 7 we extend the analysis to examine how optimal policy is adjusted in the presence of various ex ante asymmetries across ®rms. Section 8 concludes.
The Model
Consider regulating a market with two pro®t-maximizing ®rms and the familiar Hotelling structure of horizontal differentiation. Let the set of consumers be distributed uniformly over the unit interval, 0; 1, and suppose that ®rm 0 is located at t 0 and ®rm 1 at t 1; consumers are identical up to their location, denoted by t [ 0; 1. We begin with the basic structure and objectives for the consumers, ®rms and regulator and then specify the information structure and regulatory framework.
Demand and Cost Structure
The inverse demand function of an individual consumer, Pq, is smooth and strictly decreasing. Individual consumers surplus is then given by
where Vq: R q 0 Px dx. Assume that P0 ?, P? 0, and lim q?? Vq < ?; the purpose of these assumptions is to rule out corner solutions at the level of individual demand. They also imply that consumers surplus aggregated over all consumers is well de®ned.
Production and distribution are both costly activities for the ®rms. Suppose each consumer t [ 0; 1 is to consume a quantity q i t from ®rm i 0; 1. Then, aggregate quantity is Q i R 1 0 q i t dt and production costs are speci®ed as
where y i is a ®rm-speci®c cost parameter and CQ i is smooth and strictly increasing. Distribution costs for ®rm i; D i , depend on how output varies across consumers. Suppose dtq is the cost of distributing q units of output to a consumer who is a distance t from the location of the ®rm; d is thus the (constant) marginal cost of distributing a unit of output. If ®rm i distributes according to q i t, aggregate distribution costs are
where jt À ij simply indexes the distance from each ®rm to a consumer at t.
As an example, suppose each consumer is served by only one ®rm and that all REGULATION, LOCAL MONOPOLIES AND SPATIAL COMPETITION consumers receive an identical quantity of q. Let q 0 t q for t [ 0; B and q 0 t 0 for t [ B; 1 where B [ 0; 1 denotes the``boundary'' between the ®rms. Then, ®rm 0 has à`m arket'' of size B, with aggregate production of Q 0 qB. From (2), production costs are
B t qdt d=2 qB 2 and distribution costs are convex in the size of the``market'' for ®rm 0 (for ®rm 1, we replace B with 1 À B).
An individual consumer who buys q i generates a revenue of q i Pq 0 q 1 for ®rm i. Aggregating over distribution schedules of q i t for i 0; 1, pro®ts for ®rm i are de®ned as
The ®rst term is aggregate revenue for i from all potential consumers, while C i and D i are from (2) and (3). T i allows for a lump-sum tax imposed by the government (transfer, if T i < 0). We assume that the regulatory objective is the sum of aggregate consumers surplus and tax revenue:
where q : q 0 q 1 . 
Information Structure and Regulatory Framework
The regulatory instruments are the quantity schedules for each ®rm, q i t, and lump-sum taxes, T i . Prices for each consumer t are set via demand at Pq 0 t q 1 t, and may vary with consumer locations. We focus on the adverse selection problem that arises when each ®rm has private cost information and assume that the value of y i , the ®rm-speci®c parameter in production costs, is private information of ®rm i. The value of y i is drawn from a distribution F, independent across i, with a positive and differentiable density f and a support of y; y. 8 We make the standard assumption that the inverse hazard, Fy=f y, is increasing in y. In the model, the only elements of private information are the values of y i .
As is standard (the Revelation Principle applies to this problem), we study optimal policy via a direct mechanism in which the government solicits a cost report from each ®rm. A policy, O, is de®ned as a mapping from cost reports, r 1 ; r 2 , to policy instruments: O fq i t; r i ; r j ; T i r i ; r j g, for i 0; 1 and j T i, where t [ 0; 1; r i ; r j [ y; y 2 and 7 For simplicity, we specify the objective with implicit weights of zero on ®rm surplus ( pro®ts) and one on lump sum transfers. Thus, relative to a weighted average of consumer and ®rm surplus, the regulator only values rent extraction from the ®rms, and tax distortions are absent with regard to lump sum payments. As discussed in Laffont and Tirole (1993, 156) , one can incorporate these extensions in (5) above and proceed with the same techniques employed in section 3 below. Finally, since consumer surplus is linear in expenditure (quasi-linear preferences), the lump sum terms may also be used to achieve redistribution across consumers. 8 The independence assumption is important with respect to the ability of the regulator to extract all surplus (Cremer and McLean 1988). quantities are non-negative. To preserve symmetry, it is convenient to adopt the convention that the ®rst cost-report argument in q i and T i is the report from ®rm i while the second is that from j. Regulation unfolds in the standard order: ®rst, the government speci®es a policy, O; next, the ®rms simultaneously submit cost reports, r i ; r j ; ®nally, quantity schedules, lump-sum taxes and prices (via demand) are determined by evaluating the policy at the submitted cost reports. We examine Bayesian implementation. By de®nition, then, a policy is incentive compatible if it is a Bayesian equilibrium for each ®rm to report the privately observed value of the cost parameter. Thus, a strategy of reporting r i y i is optimal for i when j is expected to report r j y j . If ®rm i observes y i but reports r i while ®rm j observes y j but reports r j , then the mechanism selects quantity schedules and taxes for each ®rm based on r i and r j . De®ne revenues (net of taxes), production costs and distribution costs under O at these reports, respectively, by R i r i ; r j Z 1 0 q i t; r i ; r j Pq i t; r i ; r j q j t; r j ; r i dt À T i r i ; r j ; 6 C i y i ; r i ; r j y i CQ i r i ; r j ; where Q i r i ; r j :
If j follows the strategy of reporting r j y j , the expected pro®t to i from reporting r i when y i is observed is
For O to be incentive compatible, reporting r i y i must be optimal for i. With P i y:p i y j y, the condition for incentive compatibility (IC) is then (suppressing subscripts on r i and y i ) P i y ! p i r j y Vr; y and for i 0; 1: 10
Each ®rm is willing to participate in the regulated market if it earns a non-negative expected pro®t when the observed y value is reported. Thus, individual rationality (IR) requires P i y ! 0 Vy and for i 0; 1: 11
The regulatory objective in (5) is now given by [substituting with R i from (6)]
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WO : E
where E denotes the expectation with respect to F over y 0 and y 1 , and q : q 0 q 1 . In (12), aggregate consumers surplus now accounts for policy choice under asymmetric information by incorporating the cost-report arguments and taking expectations over cost uncertainty. The problem of the regulator, (RP), is then given by max O WO subject to (10) and (11), the incentive compatibility and individual rationality conditions, respectively. By a standard argument, (10) and (11) imply that the regulatory objective can be expressed as
where ry:y Fy=f y and the dependence of q i and Q i on y i and y j has been suppressed. De®ning c i y: R y y CQ i y; y j dFy j , the problem of the regulator (RP) can then be reduced to max fq i tg WO subject to c i y non-increasing and P i y ! 0; for i 0; 1:
The expression for WO has three components. The ®rst term is the valuation of quantity net of distribution costs at the level of an individual consumer, aggregated over all consumers. The second term involves production costs for each ®rm and these depend on cost types and aggregate production levels. Notice that the weight on the cost function is now ry i , which exceeds y i by the inverse hazard rate, re¯ecting the cost of providing each ®rm with an incentive to reveal private cost information. Finally, P i y re¯ects the individual rationality constraint; clearly, any solution to (14) has P i y 0 and these terms will vanish in (13). The structure of the two remaining components in (13) suggests a sequential approach for solving (RP). Focusing on the ®rst terms in WO, we see that the cost parameters, y 0 ; y 1 , and the aggregate production levels, Q 0 ; Q 1 , do not directly impact consumer valuations net of distribution costs. Initially, we can take them as given and solve for quantity schedules, q i t, that maximize this component, incorporating the constraint of Q i R 1 0 q i t dt. Thus, the ®rst step is to solve the problem of``distributing'' given aggregate quantities optimally across consumers. This is analyzed below in section 3.
The second step, analyzed in section 4, incorporates the valuation of the aggregate quantities from the distribution problem and solves for the optimal values of the aggregates. Private cost information enters directly into the second component of WO in (13) via the terms ry i CQ i . Solving (RP) via two steps helps to identify the economic structure of the problem. The distribution problem leads to a price schedule over consumers, showing how given aggregates are optimally distributed and also how a market for each ®rm is established; this provides a measure of marginal bene®t. The second step incorporates this measure and shows how marginal bene®ts and costs determine aggregate quantity and market size for each ®rm.
The Distribution Problem
Consider the optimal distribution of given aggregates, Q 0 and Q 1 . This is given by
subject to Q i R 1 0 q i t dt, for i 0; 1. Recalling that the cost of distribution rises with the distance from the production location, we expect that any overlap in the quantity schedules will be inef®cient: the added distribution cost generated by an overlap can be avoided bỳ`r eassigning'' consumers so that only one ®rm supplies any individual consumer. Further, such a reassignment can be done without altering the aggregates, Q 0 and Q 1 , or individual consumption levels, q 0 t q 1 t, from their original values. Formally, we have Lemma 1: In any solution to (15), there is a boundary B [ 0; 1 dividing the ®rms, such that q 0 t > 0 only if t B and q 1 t > 0 only if t > B.
An optimal distribution thus establishes two``markets''. Firm 0 serves consumers in 0; B while ®rm 1 serves those in B; 1. Now, ®x a boundary and consider the distribution problem for each market. For a market of size b > 0 and aggregate output of Q > 0, this problem is given by
For ®rm 0, this corresponds to b B and Q Q 0 . For ®rm 1, set b 1 À B and Q Q 1 and relabel consumers in the market of ®rm 1, t [ B; 1, with t
This problem is most usefully solved via optimal control, as the resulting multipliers identify the structure of prices for the optimal quantity schedule.
For a quantity schedule qt, let pt denote the price to a consumer at location t. Recalling that Pq is the inverse demand of an individual consumer, the corresponding demand function is v p : P À 1 p and, therefore, v pt qt relates the price and quantity schedules. Rewriting the aggregate quantity constraint in the form Q R The price schedule, pt, implements the distribution of Q over t [ 0; b in an intuitive fashion. The demand from each consumer t at the price pt is then the optimal quantity of qt v pt. The price schedule is linear and, as we move away from the production location, prices rise at the rate of d, re¯ecting that d is the (constant) marginal cost of distribution.
The intercept, mQ; b, positions the price schedule so that aggregate demand over the market of size 0; b is equal to aggregate production. The properties of mQ; b are easily computed (subscripts denote partial derivatives). As Q increases, we have m Q dvm db À vm À 1 < 0 so that the price schedule shifts down in order to stimulate demand for the larger production level. As b increases, we have m b À vm dbm Q > 0. The price schedule shifts up as market size increases since Q must be spread over a larger market and, consequently, higher prices are needed to induce each individual to buy less.
In this pricing scheme, consumers at different locations are charged different prices. The ef®ciency rationale, of course, is that it is more costly to serve consumers as distance from the ®rm increases. Thus, price must rise in order to reduce quantity for these higher marginal cost consumers. If regulatory policy is so oriented, nondistorting lump-sum transfers can then be employed to smooth consumer surplus across individuals. Finally, note that the above pricing scheme does not constitute price discrimination in the traditional sense since the variation of price with location coincides with the marginal cost of distribution (Tirole 1988) .
The pricing scheme in Lemma 2 may not be feasible in some settings. Markets for Cable TV services provide an example as franchise agreements may limit or prohibit differential pricing (Hazlett and Spitzer 1997) . The analysis can be modi®ed to address the case of a uniform (common) price. Each consumer purchases q Q=b at p Pq and, clearly, we have mQ; b < p < mQ; b db. Thus, distant consumers are undercharged and nearby consumers are overcharged relative to the ef®cient distribution. In this case, the optimal policy necessarily has a second-best dimension. This full information distortion associated with a uniform price is eliminated with the optimal price schedule for the distribution problem.
The value function for (16), the distribution problem, effectively summarizes the above results for later use. Formally, the value of distributing Q optimally over a market of size b is UQ; b:
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In this case, a fraction of Q is left undistributed because the value of additional output to any consumer falls below the additional distribution cost. Since output is always costly to produce, values of Q in this range are never optimal.
We have U Q m, revealing that the value of an extra unit of aggregate production is equal to the price at the production location. Further, U b Vqb À qbPqb, so that the value of an increase in market size is given by consumers surplus at the location b, the market boundary. It is routine to verify that UQ; b is strictly concave in Q; b.
Finally, let us organize these results for the next step in solving (RP). For given aggregate production levels Q 0 ; Q 1 , an optimal distribution to consumers in 0; 1 necessarily involves a boundary, B, with ®rm 0 serving the market 0; B and ®rm 1 serving B; 1. Taking B as given, we have UQ 0 ; B as the value of the optimal distribution of Q 0 over 0; B and UQ 1 ; 1 À B as the value for Q 1 over B; 1. Thus, the value of the optimal distribution over all consumers in 0; 1 depends on Q 0 and Q 1 , the aggregate production levels, and on B, the boundary dividing the two markets.
Production Aggregates and Market Size
We now solve for the production aggregates and market size under an optimal policy. First, we incorporate the distribution results into (13) and (14). Given a boundary B and production levels of Q 0 and Q 1 , the value of the optimal distribution over 0; 1 is UQ 0 ; B UQ 1 ; 1 À B. The objective in (13) is then
the problem of (RP) from (14) now reduces to solving for Q 0 ; Q 1 and B as functions of y 0 and y 1 so as to maximize (18), subject to c i y non-increasing in y for i 0; 1. We establish existence and uniqueness of an optimal policy ®rst and then proceed with the main issue of analyzing the economic structure and properties of the solution.
To analyze existence, consider pointwise maximization of the objective. Thus, let wQ 0 ; Q 1 ; B; y 0 ; y 1 denote the integrand in (18) under the E expectation. Maximizing w at each y 0 ; y 1 yields production aggregates that satisfy the incentive constraint. Thus, we have Proposition 1: For each pair of cost parameters y 0 ; y 1 , there exist production aggregates and a boundary, Q 0 ; Q 1 ; B, that maximize wQ 0 ; Q 1 ; B; y 0 ; y 1 . The maximizing choices for production satisfy Q i y i ; y j ! Q i ŷ i ; y j for y i <ŷ i and, consequently, c i y i is non-increasing in y i . Thus, (RP) has a solution and an optimal policy exists.
Uniqueness of the optimal policy depends on the relative strength of three forces: the slope of demand, the cost diseconomies in market size due to distribution, and the potential extent of increasing returns in production. Recalling the distribution problem, the ®rst two forces are summarized by how the price schedule in each market shifts in response to a REGULATION, LOCAL MONOPOLIES AND SPATIAL COMPETITION change in aggregate production. The third, of course, depends on concavity or convexity in production costs. As a suf®cient condition for uniqueness, suppose that
where m mQ; b. In this condition, the right-hand side is the slope of the marginal cost of production, scaled by ry to account for the incentive cost of private information. The lefthand side is related to the effect of Q changes on the demand schedule for a market size of b.
As Q varies, the price schedule across consumers in the market shifts downward, with m Q measuring the size of the shift. Since we know m Q < À d=vm, condition (19) implies that market demand crosses the marginal cost curve one time from above. We then have
Proposition 2: Suppose (19) holds for all Q, b and y. Then the optimal policy is unique.
Although the analysis of (19) is involved, the economic intuition is relatively simple. For any given market size, there is only one value for aggregate production where demand and marginal cost cross each other. Incorporating this, there is then only one value for the market boundary that balances costs and bene®ts across the two markets.
11 Uniqueness is guaranteed if there are no increasing returns in production C HH ! 0 as (19) necessarily holds in this case. Condition (19) allows for increasing returns C HH < 0 as long as they are not too large relative to demand. As aggregate demand becomes steeper, (19) is more likely to hold (e.g., greater diseconomies in distribution, as with a rise in d).
The Structure of the Optimal Policy
We now examine the economic structure of production levels and market size in the optimal policy. To simplify the exposition, suppose that (19) holds and the solution is unique. The optimal policy is then fully characterized by the Kuhn±Tucker conditions for pointwise maximization of WO. We focus on the case of interior solutions for Q 0 ; Q 1 ; B.
12 Taking the relevant partials of w, the integrand in (18), and simplifying, we ®nd Q 0 : mQ 0 ; B ry 0 C H Q 0 ; 20
11 The analysis of uniqueness is complicated by the fact that w need not be concave in Q 0 ; Q 1 ; B since w is the sum over two markets of the net value of distribution over production cost in each market. 12 It is straightforward to apply the Kuhn±Tucker conditions and analyze corner solutions (this is examined when we consider ex-ante asymmetries). If the range of variation in the ®rm-speci®c cost parameter is suf®ciently large, then the difference between ry and ry can justify a``monopoly'' market of 0; 1 for the lower cost ®rm while the higher cost ®rm is shut down.
The ®rst-order conditions for quantities follow directly from U Q m. For the boundary, recall from section 4 that U b is consumers surplus at the boundary of the market. Then (22) follows by expressing U b for each market in terms of prices. In general, the system must be solved simultaneously for the optimal Q 0 ; Q 1 ; B policy. Two economic forces operate in the determination of optimal production levels and market size. First, for quantities, we have marginal cost pricing adjusted for the incentive cost of private information. For a consumer at the production location of the ®rm (t 0 or t 1), distribution costs are zero and the price for this consumer then equals the underlying marginal cost of production plus the incentive cost generated by private information. Second, for market size, we have the equalization of individual consumers surplus at the boundary. Because consumers surplus is a function of price, this condition reduces to equal prices at the boundary. For ®rm 0, the price schedule rises linearly at the rate d from the intercept of mQ 0 ; B, and at the optimal boundary it intersects the corresponding price schedule of ®rm 1.
The following example illustrates the economic intuition for how cost structure and demand elasticity interact to determine the optimal policy.
Example: Constant Returns and Demand Elasticity
Assuming constant returns, CQ Q, the ®rst-order conditions simplify as follows. Letting r i ry i , we see from (20) and (21) that mQ 0 ; B r 0 and mQ 1 ; 1 À B r 1 . Thus, price at each ®rm's location is determined by the marginal cost (incentive adjusted) of serving an adjacent customer and does not depend on aggregate quantity or the boundary. With prices determined, we can solve the boundary condition (22) directly for
Recall that B is set to equalize prices for the consumer at B. Intuitively, since we know price at each location from costs and we know that the price schedule rises at rate d, the boundary is determined explicitly in terms of marginal cost. Finally, we can determine aggregate quantities for each market from B and r i via the m function, which does depend on consumer demand. To examine the role of demand elasticity, suppose that PÀ b where b > 0. Thus, demand elasticity is constant at 1=b; demand is elastic when b < 1 and inelastic when b > 1. 13 Since prices and the boundary are determined directly by costs under constant returns, we readily solve (20) and (21) to ®nd optimal quantities for i 0; 1 of
13 Consumer surplus is well de®ned (®nite) with elastic demand but it diverges (to in®nity) when demand is inelastic. Thus, suppose that demand is zero above some reservation price; then consumer surplus is ®nite and the optimal choices are always interior for a suf®ciently high reservation price.
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where g:1 À b=b. Demand is elastic when g > 0 and as g rises we ®nd that Q i increases. Thus, more elastic demand implies a larger aggregate quantity for each ®rm. Since B does not vary with g, quantity increases for all consumers. When g < 0 and demand is inelastic, we ®nd that Q i declines as g falls and demand becomes more inelastic. As g ? À 1 (i.e., b ? ?) and demand becomes completely inelastic (vertical at q 1), we see that each aggregate quantity converges to the ®rm's market size (B and 1 À B), with each consumer receiving a quantity of 1 unit. The incentive structure of the optimal policy can be understood by considering the effect of variations in the relative production ef®ciency of the ®rms (via y). Figure 1 illustrates how the optimal market structure responds to these variations for several cases. As a benchmark, in the simple case of equal cost draws, ry 0 ry 1 , the optimal policy has equal market sizes B 1=2 and symmetric price schedules for the two markets. Now suppose that ®rm 0 has a higher cost draw, so that ry 0 > ry 1 . If market size were to remain ®xed at B 1=2, then we see from (20) that price falls below marginal cost in market 0 and, therefore, a reduction in Q 0 would be warranted. In turn, this would imply an upward shift in the price schedule for market 0 and, from (22), we see that ®rm 1 could more ef®ciently supply consumers at the boundary between the ®rms.
The optimal adjustment of market size to the increase in ry 0 thus entails B < 1=2 and the relatively more ef®cient ®rm 1 is awarded part of the ®rm 0 market. Further, Q 0 is reduced while Q 1 is increased. As regards prices, the price schedule for market 0 shifts up. As illustrated in ®gure 1, however, the shift in market 1 depends on the extent of scale economies in production. These comparative statics are summarized in Proposition 3: In the optimal policy, (i) the boundary By 0 ; y 1 is decreasing in y 0 and increasing in y 1 ; (ii) each production aggregate Q i y i ; y j is decreasing in y i and increasing in y j ; (iii) the price schedule for ®rm i shifts up as y i increases, and it shifts up as y j increases if C HH > 0 (down if C HH < 0 ). Figure 1 illustrates these effects for the cost shift from y 0 y 1 to y 0 > y 1 . When C HH > 0, the market 1 price schedule shifts up. Intuitively, since Q 1 is larger we must have higher prices in market 1 as marginal cost rises with output under decreasing returns. Thus, the expansion in market 1 entails higher prices and lower quantities for consumers in the original market served by ®rm 1. The shifted consumers are served more ef®ciently by ®rm 1 than by ®rm 0, but the expansion does have a negative impact on the original consumers of ®rm 1. In contrast, with C HH < 0 the market 1 price schedule shifts down. The intuition is similar as, with Q 1 up, increasing returns means lower marginal cost and prices can fall. Thus, as the ®rm 1 market expands, the original consumers bene®t from lower prices and higher quantities. 14 To summarize the incentive structure of the optimal policy, we see that as a ®rm has higher costs it is assigned a smaller market and produces less. The other ®rm gains in market size, produces more output, and the welfare effects for consumers in the original market depend directly on the nature of scale economies in production.
The Effect of Asymmetric Information
We now consider how asymmetric information in¯uences the optimal policy relative to the case of full information (the ®rst best allocation). Thus, we consider how Q 0 ; Q 1 ; B are set when the cost parameters are y 0 ; y 1 and compare this to the policy at ry 0 ; ry 1 . This isolates the incentive distortions that arise as a consequence of the adverse selection problem associated with asymmetric cost information.
To build intuition, start with the simple benchmark case of a common cost draw, y 0 y 1 . As we know, B 1=2 and this is the same under full information (FI) and asymmetric information (AI). In this case, the effect of AI is concentrated on a downward distortion of quantities. Since ry i > y i for each ®rm, (20) and (21) imply that, with B unchanged, Q i must fall for each ®rm relative to the FI case. This brings demand into balance with marginal cost, which includes the added incentive cost under AI. Thus, the incentive distortions due to AI for this case take the form of quantity reductions while the boundary is unchanged. Now consider different cost draws and take y 0 > y 1 , so that ®rm 0 is relatively less ef®cient. From Proposition 3, both information cases have the optimal boundary below 1/2 and Q 1 exceeding Q 0 . We can identify three different effects of AI on policy choices; we start with the setting of constant returns in production C HH 0 as these effects are easiest to distinguish in this case. Let B AI and B FI denote the optimal boundary, respectively, under AI and FI and, for convenience, adopt the normalization of C H 1.
15
Consider whether B FI 9B AI . We know that price in each market is balanced with marginal cost. Under constant returns, however, marginal cost does not vary with quantity. As a result, price in each market equals the relevant cost parameter and, from (24), we see that the optimal boundary is fully determined by the relative cost ef®ciency of the two ®rms:
Under the hazard condition, AI increases the cost differential to ry 0 À ry 1 from y 0 À y 1 . Thus, B AI < B FI and AI distorts the boundary towards 0, expanding market 1 and reducing market 0. Figure 2 graphs the situation for market 0. First, marginal cost shifts from y 0 up to r 0 . Next, when the boundary is reduced from B FI to B AI , there is an inward shift of market 0 demand to mQ 0 ; B AI , as a smaller market has lower demand. We then see from ®gure 2 that Q 0 is distorted downwards as a result of AI. In market 1, we have a similar cost shift from y 1 to r 1 ; the demand shift, however, is outward since B AI < B FI means that market 1 is larger than under FI. The net effect on Q 1 is ambiguous since the cost shift pushes Q 1 down while the demand shift pushes Q 1 up.
Relative to full information, asymmetric information thus has three effects on the optimal policy choices. As illustrated with the constant returns setting, these are (i) an upward shift in marginal cost curves in each market, (ii) demand shifts in each market, in opposite directions, due to boundary adjustment, and (iii) price adjustments in each market as determined by scale economies in production. Constant returns provides a simple illustration of these effects because the cost shifts (i) directly determine the demand shifts (ii) and no price adjustment due to scale economies (iii) is necessary. In general, however, (ii) and (iii) are interdependent.
We illustrate the three effects in ®gure 3 for both markets when y 0 > y 1 and, for the purposes of the graph, we suppose that B AI < B FI and that C HH < 0 (increasing returns). With y 0 > y 1 , the boundary is below 1/2 and market 1 has the larger production aggregate. Hence, market 0 is graphed on the left on market 1 on the right. Effect (i), the marginal cost shifts re¯ecting the increase from y i to ry i , is depicted by the upward shift in each market. Holding the boundary ®xed at B FI , quantity would fall in each market as we move up the respective market demand curves (A to B and D to E in ®gure 3).
When the boundary is adjusted to B AI , demand shifts in for market 0 and out for market 1. Effects (ii) and (iii) are depicted by the movement along the AI marginal cost curve for each market (B to C and E to F). The size of the demand shift, (ii), and the extent of returns to scale, (iii), determine the magnitude of quantity and price adjustment. While Q 0 must fall, Q 1 may rise or fall due to offsetting effects from (ii) and (iii); the graph depicts the case of a rise in Q 1 .
The response of the optimal boundary B to AI is pivotal. Analytically, the comparison of FI to AI (y i to ry i ) has a discrete nature. To isolate the economic forces that drive the three effects created by AI, we can examine how the optimal boundary changes for costtype parameters along a linear interpolation between the AI and FI type pairs. 16 This leads 16 One could also interpret the interpolation as in Chen and Rosenthal (1996) where there is an ex-ante likelihood that the principal observes the agent's private information prior to designing the mechanism. See also the proof technique (homotopic transformation) in Severinov (2003) .
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directly to a suf®cient condition for when AI and incentive distortions lead to larger market size adjustments relative to FI. We have 
for all h 0 ; h 1 such that y i h i ry i ; i 0; 1, and h 0 À y 0 Fy 0 = f y 0 À 1 h 1 À y 1 Fy 1 =f y 1 À 1 ; in (23) variables are indexed by i 0; 1 and (implicitly) evaluated at the optimal policy for h 0 ; h 1 . When the inequality in (23) Note that aggregate production must fall whenever a ®rm's market size is reduced. Thus, under AI, at least one of the ®rms must produce less. Essentially, Proposition 4 formalizes the intuition behind ®gures 2 and 3. Under constant returns, (23) always holds as it collapses to the hazard property.
Consider how the optimal boundary change under AI is determined. First, ®x y 0 > y 1 for the discussion. The ®rst two terms in (23) re¯ect effect (i). The hazard rate term, which increases with y, favors a decreasing boundary because there is a relatively larger cost shift in market 0. Scale economies determine the in¯uence of the C H term. Under increasing returns, C HH < 0, we see that C
Increasing returns thus favors a decreasing boundary as the larger production level in market 1 reinforces the hazard rate term in the cost shift. Decreasing returns, however, will offset the hazard rate term as Q 1 > Q 0 now implies a higher marginal cost for ®rm 1.
The bracketed term in (23) re¯ects effects (ii) and (iii). Under (19), this term is positive and it is above or below 1 as C HH is negative or positive. Consider the demand component. Because B < 1=2, we know from (22) that there is a positive price differential between markets, m 0 À m 1 > 0. As is easily veri®ed, this implies m 0 Q < m 1 Q so that market 0, the smaller market, has a steeper demand curve. When C HH < 0, the bracketed term increases with m Q so that the demand component favors increasing the boundary. Intuitively, the bracketed term measures the price response in each market due to the cost shift, accounting for an optimal response in quantity to the cost shift. When market 1 has a larger response, as occurs under increasing returns, the price differential m 0 À m 1 narrows and an increase in B is needed to bring consumers surplus into balance for a consumer at the boundary of the markets. Under decreasing returns, the differential widens and a decrease in B is favored. A similar intuition applies to the cost parameter term in the denominator of the bracketed term. With h 0 > h 1 , the price differential widens (narrows) under increasing (decreasing) returns and B is pushed down (up).
The optimal boundary response to AI thus involves the interaction of several economic factors. While each factor has a systematic in¯uence on B that derives from the structure of the larger versus the smaller market, it is the net in¯uence of these factors that determines whether market size rises or falls as an incentive distortion associated with AI. 17 The case of constant returns provides a useful benchmark where, because the interaction of effects (i±iii) is simpli®ed and the shift in the hazard term directly implies a widening of the price differential, we can conclude that both the market of the higher cost ®rm and aggregate quantity must be reduced. In general, condition (23) provides the guidelines for assessing the impact of the AI cost and demand effects on the boundary and, consequently, for setting optimal policy.
Ex-ante Asymmetric Firms
In a number of settings, there are known ex-ante differences between ®rms. For example, the ®rms may employ different production technologies, as with traditional Cable TV and newer direct broadcast satellite (DBS) based suppliers. In this section, we relax the assumption of ex-ante symmetry in three directions and explore brie¯y how policy is impacted by asymmetries in distribution costs d, the degree of asymmetric information F, and the location of ®rms in the unit-interval l. To keep the focus on these asymmetries, we work with the simple case of constant marginal costs and set C H 1. First, consider distribution costs and suppose d i is ®rm speci®c. Under the literal interpretation as a transportation cost, this allows one ®rm to have an ef®ciency advantage at distribution. Alternatively, viewed as horizontal differentiation, this allows for greater heterogeneity in consumer valuations across the two ®rms. For the analysis, note that d i impacts the value function for the distribution problem, and we now have UQ 0 ; B; d 0 UQ 1 ; 1 À B; d 1 as the value across all consumers. From the ®rst-order conditions, the optimal boundary is now
Optimal quantities are set to balance demand over each market, with mQ 0 ; B; d 0 ry 0 and mQ 1 ; 1 À B; d 1 ry 1 . To sort out the effects, suppose d 0 > d 1 so that ®rm 0 is less ef®cient at distribution. Then, B falls and the market shifts in favor of ®rm 1. With equal cost draws, the market boundary is below 1/2 when d 0 > d 1 ; also, a relative distribution advantage for ®rm 1 (small d 0 ) ampli®es the boundary reduction when ®rm 1 also has a production cost advantage ry 1 < ry 0 . Further, Q 0 falls while Q 1 rises, re¯ecting the shift in market sizes. The price implementation involves extending the ®rm 1 price schedule towards the lower boundary (no shift); the price intercept for ®rm 0 rises and the schedule becomes steeper, as prices must rise to reduce demand for the smaller output and market size. The limiting case of this asymmetry, where the transportation cost for one of the ®rms vanishes, is explored further below in conjunction with asymmetric ®rm locations.
Next, consider the degree of information asymmetry across ®rms. The familiar notion of hazard-rate dominance, f 0 y=F 0 y f 1 y=F 1 y; Vy [ y; y, provides a useful comparison framework (Laffont and Tirole 1993, 77) . In our analysis, the net change is that we must employ r i y : y F i y=f i y for the incentive cost of each ®rm. The effects on the boundary and quantities then follow directly from our previous analysis of AI versus FI effects: r 0 y > r 1 y is analogous to ry 0 > ry 1 in the ®rst-order conditions. Thus, the increased incentive cost with ®rm 0 pushes towards a smaller market with lower quantity for ®rm 0 and an expansion for ®rm 1 (at any pair of cost draws).
As an example, suppose ®rm 1 employs an older generation technology that has a known cost of y while ®rm 0 employs a newer technology with F 0 on y; y. For instance, in health care markets, ®rm 1 might be a hospital that employs an existing treatment or diagnosis technology while ®rm 0 employs a new technique with uncertain costs. Then, as the incentive cost with ®rm 1 is nil, this favors a shift in market allocation to the less ef®cient ®rm 1. Even though it is common knowledge that the new technology is more ef®cient, incentive costs make it optimal to maintain a market for ®rm 1. In fact, the information asymmetry can even lead to the``shelving'' of the superior new technology.
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In determining the boundary, the older ®rm's market is somewhat``protected'' by the asymmetry in incentive costs.
Finally, let us consider the location of the ®rms. Suppose that ®rm 0 has an interior location at an l 0 [ 0; 1; for simplicity, maintain ®rm 1 at the right endpoint. We expect that ®rm 0 will typically serve nearby consumers on the left and to the right of l 0 . Now, however, there is also the more subtle possibility that a``divided'' market structure will emerge, with ®rm 1 serving customers who are suf®ciently far from ®rm 0 on both sides. Extending the analysis, we ®nd an analog to Lemma 1 in which there may now be a lower boundary B L [ 0; l 0 as well as the previously developed upper boundary, denoted by B U [ l 0 ; 1. Firm 0 serves consumers in B L ; B U while ®rm 1 serves those in 0; B L and B U ; 1. The distribution results in Lemma 2 apply directly to each potential market segment. The analog to the objective in (18) then works out to be
The various terms re¯ect the value of distributing output across the four potential segments as well as the associated costs. The new term of
1 associated with ®rm 1 is due to the divided market structure and re¯ects the cost of serving the distant segment of 0; B L from a distance of 1 À B L . After accounting for this cost, ®rm 1 is effectively serving that segment from an origin of B L . We are also allowing for d 0 T d 1 . The analysis of the upper 18 Let F 0 be the uniform distribution. The condition for B reduces to B 1=2 y y À 2y 0 =2d. Then ®rm 0 is active only when y 0 < d y y=2; for higher y 0 , we have B 0 and all of the market goes to the less ef®cient ®rm. In a different context, (Wang 2000) considers oligopoly incentive regulation in a two-type model when ®rms have different ex ante probabilities of cost draws and ®nds that ex ante inef®cient ®rms will sometimes be awarded all production.
boundary and the associated quantities follows previous lines, so we focus here on the lower segments. For the lower boundary, ®rm 0 produces output such that m
is the required price from ®rm 0 to a consumer at the location l 0 . For ®rm 1, we must have m
; d 1 is the required price from ®rm 1 to a consumer at location B L . In addition to the incentivecost adjustment, there is also an added price premium to re¯ect the cost of serving a divided market. Recalling that Sv p is individual consumers surplus at price p, the optimal choice for the B L boundary satis®es
upon substituting the output conditions. To interpret this condition, note that if ry 1 d 1 < ry 0 d 0 l 0 , then it makes ef®ciency sense for ®rm 1 to be the supplier for the consumer at location t 0. However, the boundary B L is not set to equalize consumer surplus at location B L . That would be incorrect for two reasons. L . Thus, the bene®t margin associated with reducing the distance to the distribution center is given by d 1 Q L 1 . Second, the marginal bene®t from shifting the boundary hinges on consumer surplus for a consumer at the opposite end of the market segment relative to the origin; this is location t B L for ®rm 0 while it is t 0 for ®rm 1. Again, it is helpful to think of ®rm 1 as having a distribution center at location B L . Thus, the change in value for the 0; B L market as B L rises is the consumers surplus of the distant consumer t 0 plus the bene®t associated with reducing the distance from ®rm 1's location to the segment origin of B L and this is equated with the corresponding consumers surplus for the distant consumer t B L in the B L ; l 0 segment of ®rm 0. As an application of the analysis of a divided market structure, consider the MultiChannel Video Programming Distributor Market, de®ned as the video services market supplied by The nature of the horizontal differentiation involves several components. Cable TV typically has superior options for local channel viewing; DBS often has superior picture quality and offers more options in speci®c areas such as sports, movies and music. In each case, heterogeneity across consumers for the valuation of these differences is signi®cant. On the technology side, DBS has a clear`w ireless'' component in that costs of delivery do not depend directly on the consumer's geographical proximity to a cable network. To explore the intuition from the model, imagine ®rm 0 as cable provider with d 0 > 0 while ®rm 1 is a DBS provider with d 1 0, re¯ecting a``wireless'' technology for distribution. The condition for the lower boundary now reduces to B L l 0 À ry 1 À ry 0 =d 0 . The wireless dimension creates a natural advantage for ®rm 1 in supplying a consumer who has a poor horizontal match with ®rm 0. As a result, this force pushes to a divided market as an optimal structure. 20
Conclusion
This paper examines optimal regulation in a duopoly model of spatial competition when ®rms have private cost information. The key feature here is that the regulator can provide incentives by utilizing the spatial dimension, increasing or decreasing each ®rm's market through the assignment of consumers at the competitive fringe between the ®rms. Thus, the analysis focuses on the trade-off between assignment of market segments and the allocation of production across consumers in each ®rm's market segment. Providing incentives through market assignment reduces the need to rely on quantity distortions.
The properties of optimal regulatory policy can be summarized as follows. Because distribution is costly, it is optimal to award distinct market segments and allow consumption to vary with consumer location. To implement an ef®cient distribution of output in each market segment, each ®rm employs a price schedule that involves a ®xed fee plus a variable charge based on location. Market segments and production aggregates are jointly determined by equating demand in each segment with marginal production cost, scaled upwards to account for incentive costs, and equalizing consumers surplus at the boundary between the market segments.
Market size and production both decline as a ®rm becomes less ef®cient. The other ®rm is awarded a larger market by reassigning customers and also produces more in aggregate. Welfare effects for prior customers of this ®rm vary with scale economies in production as these consumers bene®t under increasing returns but consume less and pay more under decreasing returns. Compared to the full information setting, we identify three effects on regulated market structure that arise under asymmetric information. A cost effect, which depends on the inverse hazard rate, dominates and optimal policy makes market segments and production more responsive to ef®ciency differences between the ®rms in the benchmark case of constant returns in production.
The problem of market design and endogenous market structure provides a broader context for our results. We have made the relatively strong assumption that horizontal differentiation is effectively observable to the regulator. In the case of health care markets and selective contracting, the insurer (regulator) does make use of information about member patients (consumers) to design a network of providers by taking into account 20 The B L choice is interior to 0; l 0 when d 0 l 0 ry 0 > ry 1 > ry 0 , respectively for the left and right endpoints. Note that a pure wireless technology is a convenient simpli®cation. What matters for a divided market is that d 1 is suf®ciently small relative to d 0 .
capacity needs in geographic regions and price considerations. 21 Of course, these health care markets also involve a complex set of factors (e.g., quality, access, patient choice of insurance plans) that are not captured fully in our present analysis. Spectrum auctions provide another example of market design in which horizontal differentiation involving regions plays an important role. Governments often design an auction for licenses to operate in explicit regional markets. Bidders then compete to acquire a strategic collection of regional licenses and the auction (mechanism) can be viewed as allocating market regions in response to bids (reports) that are based on private information of the bidders; see Cramton and Schwartz (2000) for a recent discussion. In other contexts, however, signi®cant elements of horizontal (and vertical) differentiation arise because of buyer preferences. This information is less likely to be readily available to regulators and is an interesting direction for future work. where qt q 0 t q 1 t. Then Q 0 X 0 1 and Q 1 X 1 0 hold in relation to aggregate production. Now, de®ne quantity schedules by
where XB Q 0 . Such a B exists since X0 0; X1 Q 0 Q 1 , and Xt is continuous on 0; 1. Let X Ã 0 , X Ã 1 , and X Ã be the corresponding cumulatives. Under q 0 and q 1 , the objective in (15) can be expressed as 
Now, let qt be the control variable; let À Xt be the state variable, which must satisfy the differential equation _ Xt qt; the control must satisfy qt ! 0 and the state must satisfy X0 0 and Xb Q, the constraint from (16).
To establish existence of a solution, we can apply the existence theorem developed by Seierstad and Sydsaeter (1987, 137) . It is routine to verify that all of the conditions of the theorem are satis®ed with qt and the``multiplier'' pt as reported in Lemma 2.
There are two cases for the values of Q and b. When Q < R b 0 vdt dt, the multiplier is strictly positive for all t and Xb Q holds at the solution. The condition in Lemma 2 determines p0 mQ; b in this case. When Q ! R b 0 vdt dt, we have p0 0 and the solution is described in the footnote to Lemma 2. & Proof of Proposition 1: Consider the existence of Q 0 ; Q 1 ; B that maximize wQ 0 ; Q 1 ; B; y 0 ; y 1 . Clearly, w is continuous in Q 0 ; Q 1 ; B. The value function satis®es UQ; b < UQ; 1 U R 1 0 vdt dt; 1, and ryCQ is strictly increasing in Q. Hence, any maximizing choice must be an element of the compact set 0; R 1 0 vdt dt 2 60; 1. Thus, there exists a maximizing choice. Now let Q 0 ; Q 1 ; B be an optimal choice at y 0 ; y 1 and let Q 0 ;Q 1 ;B be an optimal choice at ŷ 0 ; y 1 whereŷ 0 > y 0 . Then wQ 0 ; Q 1 ; B; y 0 ; y 1 ! wQ 0 ;Q 1 ;B; y 0 ; y 1 and wQ 0 ;Q 1 ;B;ŷ 0 ; y 1 ! wQ 0 ; Q 1 ; B;ŷ 0 ; y 1 , by de®nition of optimal choices. By de®nition of w, adding the two preceding inequalities and simplifying yield ry 0 CQ 0 À CQ 0 ! rŷ 0 CQ 0 À CQ 0 . As ry 0 < rŷ 0 when y 0 <ŷ 0 , we must haveQ 0 Q 0 in order to satisfy the above inequality. The argument for Q 1 is analogous. By de®nition, it is clear that c i y i is non-increasing in y i if Q i y i ; y j is nonincreasing in y i . Finally, since the Q i y i ; y j in the pointwise maximization of w satisfy the incentive constraint for c i y i , we have a solution to (RP) . &
Proof of Proposition 2:
The complicating factor for uniqueness is that wQ 0 ; Q 1 ; B; y 0 ; y 1 is not necessarily concave in Q 0 ; Q 1 ; B, even with the added assumption of (19). To proceed, then, consider the value of an optimal quantity choice for a given market of size b: gb; r : max Q!0 fUQ; b À rCQg. Proposition 1 directly implies that a maximizing Q exists and, hence, that gb; r is well de®ned. The choice of Q is unique if UQ; b À rCQ is strictly concave in Q. We have 
the numerator is positive by (19) and the denominator is positive by (A2). Hence, g bb < 0. Finally, the value of B in any optimal choice of Q 0 ; Q 1 ; B for wQ 0 ; Q 1 ; B; y 0 ; y 1 must satisfy B [ arg max b fgb; ry 0 g1 À b; ry 1 g. Proposition 1 implies such a B exists. The choice is unique as g bb < 0 implies g bb b; ry 0 g bb 1 À b; ry 1 < 0. Thus, we have shown that (19) implies a unique maximizing choice of Q 0 ; Q 1 ; B and, from Proposition 1, this maximizing choice at each y 0 ; y 1 is the optimal policy. & Proof of Proposition 3: This is a relatively straightforward comparative statics exercise and we limit the proof to a sketch. First, calculate the comparative statics for B by employing the value function gb; r from the Proof of Proposition 2. The claim then follows from g bb < 0 and g br À m Q À rC HH À 1 vm dbm Q C H < 0. Let Q fb; r be the unique optimal Q choice for the gb; r value function. The claims for Q i y i ; y j then follow from Q i y i ; y j fBy i ; y j ; ry i .
For the price effects, the price at the boundary can be written as mf1 À B; ry 1 ; 1 À B d1 À B, where B By 0 ; y 1 . This is increasing in y 0 since gb; r is concave in b and B is decreasing in y 0 . The intercept for market 0 is the boundary price less dB, and this is increasing in y 0 . We ®nd that the intercept in market 1 is increasing or decreasing in y 0 as fm Q m Q À rC HH À 1 À 1g90, where arguments are evaluated at Q 1 y 1 ; y 0 and By 0 ; y 1 ; this inequality reduces to C HH 90. Here, g i bb and g i br must be evaluated at b bh 0 a; h 1 a and r h 0 a for i 0, and at b 1 À bh 0 a; h 1 a and r h 1 a for i 1. Since g bb < 0, we can substitute for g br with the expression from the Proof of Proposition 3 to see that g H a < 0 D
where Q 0 fbh 0 a; h 1 a; h 0 a and m 0 mQ 0 ; bh 0 a; h 1 a and similarly for Q 1 and m 1 . Then (23) follows upon noting that prices are equalized for each ®rm at the optimal boundary. For the second claim, note that Q AI i fBy i ; y j ; ry i . We know that f b > 0 > f r . Then ry i > y i and B AI < B FI directly imply the claim. &
